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posted by Elaxia on 6 May 2023, 03:44
Yeah, that was me representing KPMG at Alexandra Palace. Fun times.
posted by KPMG on 7 Apr 2010, 02:00
When I was at City Hall in the evening, I spoke to John who told me that the data from the counting centres were feed straight through to City Hall on a live link. That way both London Elects and Indra staff at City Hall knew exactly what was going on at all points in time and they had extra copies of all the data backed-up / recorded there. I also noted someone at Ally Pally with a KPMG badge, though I did not speak to him to confirm who he was.
posted by Daryl Lloyd on 4 May 2008, 12:17
Except for Merton and Wandsworth, that is. I'll try and scribble up a diagram (unless the maps of the layout the counting staff had can be easily obtained)
posted by Alex Robinson on 3 May 2008, 13:13
I can confirm that at least one person from KPMG was present at Olympia. He had a badge saying KPMG and confirmed that he was indeed from KPMG. I saw him numerous times throughout the whole day carrying his clipboard. He obviously wouldn't answer any questions about what he was doing or whether he was present for the audit or the stack of spare scanners. Stupidly, I didn't take his name.
posted by Alex Robinson on 3 May 2008, 13:01
I asked several Indra people, and they all confirmed that there were no auditors from KPMG in the count centre. So whatever these Indra people were doing was not subject to oversight from KPMG.
posted by Alex Tingle on 3 May 2008, 10:37
Regardless of their instructions, they often seemed happy to talk, as long as they weren't busy.
posted by Alex Tingle on 3 May 2008, 10:35
It wasn't clear to me who was a DCRO. The id badges (at least in Merton & Wandsworth) didn't seem to make the distinction. The CRO's badge definitely did NOT identify him as such - it just said "Chief Executive".
posted by Alex Tingle on 3 May 2008, 10:32
Mainly involved feeding through of cleaning paper.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:31
This is a good view of how each of the 6 constituencies being counted at Olympia were laid out. Scanning on left, first stage adjudication at front, verification or registration at front right, scanning at right and CRO adjudication at back (with large screen).
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:30
In this photo there are a number of counting agents. For much of the day first level adjudication went on without any attention from the parties.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:28
First level adjudication was done by more junior count staff - only second stage adjudication was done by DCROs (and in practice, more junior support staff)
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:27
Staff were instructed not to talk to observers. We had no way to know what they were doing, whether they were reprogramming the equipment or updating the database(s) on the fly - which problems later in the day suggested might be occurring. Also unclear whether their laptops, the servers, and the counting equipment around Olympia were all networked together, to City Hall, and/or to the wider Internet.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:25
Counting agents and observers were shown these pieces of paper to assure them the machines had been zero - no other way possible of observing the accuracy of this.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:23
Contentious ballots were projected on screen and a decision made by the CRO and their staff after input from the political party representatives usually watching.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:20
Ballots were input in the bottom half and output into the hopper visible here. They quite often curled up as the output pile grew and had to be quickly snatched out by the operators.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:18
The polling station counts were later checked against the number of ballot papers scanned. A verification process was used to resolve difficulties - with rescans if the differences were greater than a small number.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:17
The barcode reader was used to scan the barcode on each new ballot box as it was opened for counting. The barcodes on the back of the ballot papers were scanned by the scanning machine at the same time as the front of the papers.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:16
From the increasingly frequent rebooting of the scanner stations later in the day, the PCs looked to be booting Windows XP from a local disk, then running the count software from a shared network drive.
posted by Ian Brown on 3 May 2008, 10:15